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FOREWORD
First, I would like to thank the Program Committee for giving the launch mite
the opportunity to provide visibility from our experience base back into the
technology development process. I feel this is very important if we are to
resolve these large deficiencies; they must be made visible.
Until now, our main thrust has been simply getting into and back from space.
All criteria has been based or, performance p_r_m_t_r_, such as ISP, G_, T/W,
mass fraction, etc. The rocket engine development, because of required long
lead, led the process by establishing artificial interfaces for the design and
operational control, The engine contract end item specification (CEI) and
interface control document (ICD) were used for ease of procurement and develop-
ment testing and to establish interface requirement for whoever desired its
use. The vehicle, therefore, would assume the weight and operational burden of
all the systems demanded by the engine. The mission use would determine the
vehicle size and the n_m%ber of engines required. Cost and launch rate were not
of concern during the early years.
During the Apollo lunar exploration program, it became apparent that the Apollo
vehicle launch operations were consuming a very large part of the agency
budget, leaving very little for other scientific _grk and no new start pro-
grams. Therefore, we determined that developing a new vehicle that reus¢_ the
very expensive vehicle hardware was the answer, ie., the Shuttle vehicJe was
born with expected large reductions in the cost of delivering a pound to orbit
with 60 launches per year. Forty launches at KSC and 20 at WTB per year, but
the design did not support this ambitious launch program. Also, the launch
operations crew size was nearly the same as for the Apollo vehicle. Where did
we fall short in our vision?
KSC initiated a self-examination three year study of cause and effect, led by
Bill Dickinson and performed by the Boeing Company. This effort identified the
vehicle configuration is the primary driver of thls high cost limited launch
capability. It also identified the propulsion system as a major discipline
driver. Therefore, we initiated a more in-de_d_ study of the causes and
effects with the hope of identifying major generic operations concerns that
cause the status quo. This present one-year effort has accomplished this,
along with identifying_ alternate concepts that offer major reductlons in
ccm_mlexity and manpower intensive operations. Therefore, the next 30 years we
can focus on an ambitious space exploration by applying the knowledge gained
from this visibility.
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By applying the principles of TQM (old fashioned team effort) to Advance
Planning, Conceptual Design, Development of Requirements and throt_ the Design
Development Process, we can achieve low cost, reliable, tunely access to space
and an operationally flexible space transfer system.
From our experience, the approach to follow is clear: Develop a simple,
reliable, operationally efficient, integrated propulsion m/stm_ concept that
can he used and sized for different missions/vehicles. The conee_ must be
fully integrated to achieve major reduction in propulsion components. This
approach will yield major reduction in traditional vehicle _rt systams. We
r_eed to concentrate on the use of iOx/I/q2 for all vehicle fluid needs. This
combination will provide an environmentally clean operation and will enable a
totally integrated propulsion and vehicle power capability, ie., MPS, CMS, RCS,
fuel ceils, cooling/thermal management and life m/pport systems. Now, what is
the propulsion development approach to follow?
First, we must surface the necessary technology needs to allow this ambitious
space exploration program to occur. Develop these technology items into
p,_jects and follow them through maturity for use. I can't over 8tress the
importance of a thorough maturation program, including flight tests in
cases. We. must maximize the use of manpower and facilities. After all, the
most valuable resource this country has is its people. We suggest we consider
realigning our Goverrment and industry teams and p_t practices to
perform productive work and increase operational flexibility. We must discon-
tinue our practice of creating artificial interfaces, unnecessary constraintm,
to allow _resh creative work to progress. After all, unnecessary constraints
are the enemy of the bold. The cc.qpetitive approach to advance planning and
conceptual design is very wasteful; therefore, we sugges_ the consortium
concept be considered. Let's use the _titive approach to providing high
quality hardware from at least two _m_rces.
Let us develop a means of measuring o__rabllity during our conceptual/design
process. The commercial sector ccr_pares the use time to the shop mainte-
nance/overhaul time and for them to turn a profit, this ratio n,mt be in favor
of use tire. Traditionally, we spend large amounts of time preparing for a
very short use tlme. Our conservative leaclership is reluctant to make a long
term commitment of advancing propulsion operations and give up their com_ort-
able position of accepting the statt_ quo, along with its near term personal or
corporate gains. Can we afford to continue using the old patterns (ICD's and
CEI's) while the rest of the world takes over the leadership position of space
propul sion.
Let us acoept the challenge for the future. Don't simply build a new model (an
old one with a face lift) and spend 90% of our efforts concentrating on the
lift off and ascent extravagance when it should be a routine event. But,
instead, let us work together as a team and provide real measurable progress,
allowing us to achieve the next frontier _. "Routine Access to Space."
Mr. George _ong {Rocketdyne-Canoga Park, CA) will now talk to you about how
applying the TQM team process _s a difference. He will ghare with you his
experier_e this last year and give you an example of how this experience can
influence the future of propulsion with focused tachnology development and the
freedom to be creative.
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Operationally Efficient Propulsion System
R.E. Rhodes and G.S. Wong
Advanced la .un.ch systems for the next generation of space transportation systems (1995
to 2010) must dehver largepayloads (125,000 to 500,000 Ibs)to low earthorbit(LEO) at
one tenth of today'scost,or 300 to 400 $/Ibof payload. This costrepresentsan order of
magnitude reductionfrom the Titan unmanned vehiclecostof delivenng payload toorbit.
To achieve thissizablereduction,the operationscostas well as theengine costmust both
be lower than currentengine systems. The Advanced Launch System (hA,S) isstudying
advanced engine designs,such asthe STME, which has achieved notabler_luctionincost.
This paper presen_ the resultsof a current study wherein another levelof costreduction
can be achieved by designingthe propulsion module utilizingtheseadvanced engines for
enhanced operationsefficiencyand reduced operationscost.
The operations cost of today's launch systems has become a large fraction of the
vehicle recurring cost per flight ranging from 20 to 40% for expendable and reusable
vehicles, respectively, shown in Figure 1. The complex operations requirements of current
launch vehicles have 'also limited our ability to achieve routine access to space. Since the
rocket engine/propulsion system represents one of the more complex and expensive
systems in the launch vehicle, a study was made to identify operations problems (cause and
effect concerns) which have driven operations costs to exorbitant levels. This paper
presents the importance and a description of the major operations problems encountered in
today's launch vehicles and how these problems have adversely affected our ability to
achieve serviceability, reliability and operability. It also emphasizes the need to recognize
and understand the operations problems and the effort that must be made to avoid them in
future designs, i.e. applying the "lessons learned". It describes how the operations
requirements for accessibility, maintainability and operability are allowed to star_ with the
initial engine design to drive the design r_quirements. This has never been done before and
this has been part of the reason today for the high cost vehicle launch systems and for the
large launch processing cost and time. Finally, the paper presents an example whereby a
propulsion concept that "integrates" the engine system not only results in a propulsion
system that is more operationally efficient, with sizeable reduction in operations cost, but
also results in a propulsion system that is simpler, more reliable, more operable and has
lower cost than a conventional unintegrated engine system.
Current Operation3 Problems
Processing flight hardware for launch has been a very tedious and time consuming task
requiring large numbers of people operating sophisticated ground support equipment
(GSE) to verify flight system readiness. For each subsystem assembled with the major
vehicle element, such as the Orbiter, comes the requirements for total system checkout prior
to certification fo_ight. This process has been quite complex and involves numerous other
systems during the checkout.
For Example, to support checkout of a main engine, the main propulsion system,
electrical power and distribu6on system, hydraulic system, instrumentation system, flight
control system, avionics system, environmeatal system and the purge, vent and drain
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systems must all be activated to support the engine checkout. The checkout itself also
requh'es highly trained and skilled personnel at the vehicle, in the fh'ing room and at the
GSE supplying the required commodities like gases, hydraulics, power, etc. All these
activities are in turn dependent on test conductors, quality control, safety, GSE
engineering, etc. to accomplish a successful test. As many of these activities arc "hands-
on" and serial in nature further complicates the checkout process. The ground support
system providing services and commodities also must be verified that every system is
availableand certifiedto support the test.Itis thereforenot surprisingthatoperations
support for launch system checkout iscomplex, manpower intensive,time consuming and
costlyand a launch system thatconsistsof many separate,independent systems simply
exacerbates this problem.
A typicalillus.n'ationf the technicaldisciplinesand operations supportrequiredfor
system checkout Is depicted in Figure 2. An illustrationof the large infrastructureof
logistics,supplies,equipment and facilitiesto support the system checkout isshown in
Figure 3. Every differentcommodity requiredon the vehicleadds another tentacletothe
operationssupport structure.For example, therequirementforHelium gas,no matterhow
small the amount, dictatesthe need for additionalfacilities,GSE, logistics,transportation,
etc, to insure that the gas is at the vehicle processing site when needed.
Several recent studies on hunch site experience have been made to identify operations
problems that have driven our operations cost to exorbitant levels and have severely
restricted our ability to achieve routine access to space. The Shuttle Ground Operations
Efficiencies/Technologics Study (SGOE/T) 1 investigatc_l the operations requirements of the
entire vehicle including payload and the more recent Operationally Efficient Propulsion
System Study (OEPSS)2 focused on the operationsrcqui.rcmentsof the totalpropulsion
system that included: the propellant tankage, fluid systems, structure, engines and
controls. Both studies have concluded that current operational requirements are driven by
(1) systems that arc not readily serviceable; (2) too many people arc required; (3) too much
time is needed for processing; (4) complex support facilities are needed; (5) serial
operations are required; (6) hazardous operations are involved; (7) and too many
commodities and gradesof commodity areused.
The OEPSS study has also identified some serious major problems that have plagued
our launch operations requirements and have compromised our launch capability. Figu_ 4
contains a list of these operations problems and the main propulsion system contained
within a closed aft compartment was found to have the most widespread impact on ground
operations. Other operations problems that drive operations support include the hydraulic
systems, gimbal systems, turbopumps, inch gas purge, excessive number of components,
many artificial interfaces and the lack of hardware integration. Some of these arc described
below.
Closed Aft Compartmen)
An enclosed engine compartment at the boat-tail of the launch vehicle causes numerous
ground operations problems because leakage of hazardous fluids can be confined, access is
restricted and complex GSE is required. Confinement of potential propellant leaks is a
Criticality-1 failure. A closed compartment will require an inert gas purge system, a
sophisticated hazardous gas detection system and a personnel environmental control
system. These systems in turn will require vehicle - ground interfaces and ground support
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equipment, all of which in turn will require separate specialized personnel to provide
maintenance, checkout and servicing. Moreover, inert gas purge poses personnel safety
issues.
Hydraulic System
A hydraulic system represents another fluid distribution system that must be processed
and maintained for flight operations. This involves distribution system leak cheeks, long
pea"iocls of circulation for dc-aeration/f'dtering operations associated with fluid sampling and
analysis, and functional check of all control systems. In order to process the flight system,
a ground support system consisting of all the basic hydraulic distribution system elements
must be duplicated to simulate pressure for the flight system checkout. The same
operations and maintenance requirements are also required for the ground system.
The auxiliary power units to drive the hydraulic pumps represent an additional support
system of prime mover, pumps, gearboxes, lube oil system, cooling system,
instrumentation, distribution system, etc. which will require additional maintenance and
checkout; and if a hypergolic-fueled auxiliary power unit is used, this will drive the need
for a whole separate operations support infrastructure that dictates serial operations and the
need for specially certiEed personnel to work in self-contained atmospheric protective
ensemble (SCAPE) for fueling operations.
Lack of Hardware Intet,'r'd_ion
A launch system that contains numerous separate, stand-alone systems proportionally
drives up the number of duplicate components and interfaces. This in turn exponentially
drives up the complexity and the operational support requirements. Each stand-alone
system promotes artificial interfaces and each interface represents another "break point" in
the system that must be checked and verified should the connection be broken. Each fluid
interface repre._ents a potential leak point requiring special attention for disassembly,
reassembly and leak checks. Separating fluid connections leads to potential sealing surface
damage, which in turn requires repair of the sealing surface and, if severe, requires a line
changeout. It is not uncommon in a critical system containing heLium, hydrogen or oxygen
to replace seals more than once to ensure an acceptable leak-free joint. An example of
separate stand-alone systems is a launch vehicle propulsion system using multiple
autonomous engines. The propulsion system will have as many duplicate propellant lines,
valves, thrust chambers, turbopumps, control/avionics, heat exchangers, pneumatic control
assembly, etc and interfaces as there are engines.
Systems carrying fluids such as hydrogen and oxygen necessarily dictate the use of
sophisticated, highly sensitive, operations intensive leak detection devices, such as mass
spectrometers, to verify the integrity of the seal. This requirement drives up the time
required to leak check a joint considerably. High helium content in the surrounding area
can cause leak checks to be delayed until the background is reduced or add time to the
operation by having to encapsulate each joint that is checked. Leak checking many joints
has led to time-consuming serial operations impacting the total system checkout.
In view of current experience, it is abundantly clear that operational complexity stems
from design. The operational support of current flight systems was never fully understood
nor the impact on launch processing was fully appreciated during design. In order to
achieve operational efficiency, the principle of Total Quality Management (TQM) must be
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appliedto ground operations as it is being applied to product quality, that is quaJity cannot
be inspected into the product, it must be designed into it. Therefore. operations must not
simply support the design it must change and drive the design at its conceptual beginning
towm'd g_atcr simplicity and _eater operability. This imperative approach is illustrated in
the design/build/operations cycle shown in Fig_n: 5.
.OperationallyEfficicntPro_oulsionSvst_n
To achieve operationalefficiencyfor a flightsystem thedesign must be simplifiedto
reduce operations required to suppor_ the system. An example willbe used here to
illusn'at¢how the "lessonslearned"from currentoperationsexperience(Figure4) are used
to drive the design of a propulsionsystem concept for a heavy liftlaunch vehicle,such as
the Advanced Launch System (ALS). The example willdescribehow the design can be
simplified by "integrating"the multiple engines to eliminateas many components and
interfacesas possiblewhile maintainingthere:qui.,_thrustand controlof thevehicle.
The baseline ALS vehicleshown inFigure 6 will be used as a referencevehicle for
comparing a traditionalapproach to designing a conventionalpropulsionsystem vis-a-vis
with an integratedapproach todesigning an operationallyefficientpropulsionsystem. The
ALS vehicleshown consistof a core vehicleand a side-mounted boosterwith a gross lift-
off weight (GLOW) of 3,500,000 ]bs.and a payload capabilityof 120,000 Ibs.to low
earth orbit ('LEO). Both the booster and core vehicles arc 30 R. in diameter and use
580,000 Ibs.thrust(vac)O2/H2 STME engines. The boosterand core utilize7-engines
and 3-engines,respectively,fortheirpropulsion systems.
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_urra'v.,'iryand Conciusion
Today's launch systems have resultedinhigh operationscost and low flightrates.The
complex systems have been found co bc the cause for the inordinate dine and manpower
needed to meet ground operationsrequirements and for our inabilityto achieve routine
access to space. The complex propulsionsystem forour currentlaunch systems has been a
major partof thisproblem. Inorder forfum.,x:advanced launch vehicles,such as theALS,
todeliverpayload to orbit(LEO) atlower costand at higher flightrams, thede.signof the
launch system, and particularlythepropulsionsystem,must bc _eady simplifiedand made
mo_ operationally ctTic'ient.The rtsmltsof thecurrantstudy -___-_dz_.__,-_.,_-__I.? have
shown that by utilizingan nnconventional "integrated"design approach, i low cost,
operationally efficientpropulsion system design can bc achieved. Based on the study
msuJm, the foUowing conclmior_ an: mule:
(I) To achieve an operationallyefficient,low cost propulsion design, operationscost
drivers must drive the design at the inception of concept. A design that iniddly
ignores operations problems can not subsequendy be made Iz'uly operationatly
efficient.
(2) Propulsion system design for furorelaunch systems can be made simpler and
require less operations support by reducing the number of components and
interfacesand by integratingthe system functions. This isachicvedby departing
from the convcndonal engine design approach and by using the "integrated-
component" design approach describcd.
(3) The integrated propulsion module engine as an alternativepropulsion concept for
the ALS illustratesthe following point: given a propulsion system design using
multiple stand-alone,autonomous engines,an integrateddesign of thesame system
willalways yieldan equivalentsystem thatwillhave substantiallykigherreliability
and lower unit cost.
(4) An intcgratexipropul._iondesign iswac'.ablc3 and can use e.'dstingor currentALS
technology anddoes not reqtximnew technology (enabling).
(5) An integrated design approach rcsuits in a prop_sion cicsign that is simpler, more
r_liable,more operable,lower unitcostthan a conventional design and, therefore,
emincndy meets the _ requirementsforrobusmcss, reliability,opcrability,low
cost and the abilitytoachieveroutineaccessto space.
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Figure 1
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Figure 5
TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT (TQM)
For Total Propulsion System
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Figure 6
BASELINE ALS VEHICLE
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Figure 9
FULLY INTEGRATED PROPULSION MODULE
• Single He-pressurization system'
• Single LOX.pressurizatlon system' (HX)
• Single control system'
• Torus propeltanl rnanllold allows 50% reduction of
• Tud:,opumps
• Propellant Inlel lines
• Gas generators
• Torus manifold provides "englne-out" capability
• Thrust chamber-out
• TurDo1:_Jml>OUt
*Redundancy provided in propulsion module
Figure I0
"ROgUST EP,IGINE AND ENGINE OUT" CAPABILITY
• Thrus! chamber out capability
• Thrusl chamber
• Turbopumps
• Turbopump o_Jtcapability
• Turbopumps
• Thrust chamber
85%--------"'> 100% Nora. Oper.
67%
67%--------->- 100% Nora. Opel.
85%
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Figure ii
ROBUST TURBOPUMP DESIGN
• Design margin
• Operating margin
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Figure 12
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
• Inlegraled propulslon module vs. conventional
propulsion syslem
Factor Fully Integraled Convenllonal
• Higher reltabilily
T/C and T/P out
• Lower engine (T/C) cost, SM
• Less number of parls
• Lower polenllal welghl, Ibs.
I• Lower operallons cost. %
0.993
0.999
1.83
111
76,058
-35 Io -60
0.987
2.67
t69
87,340
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Figure 13
OPERATIONS CONCERNS RESOLVED BY TECHNOLOGY
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Figure 14
OPERATIONS TECHNOLOGY APPLICATION
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CONCLUSION
• Operallons efficiency requirements mtJsl start wllh the InIllal
system design
• Operallons efficiency to reduce cost must drive the syslem design
in a TQM team environment
• Design /bui]d / operate
• The Integrated propulsion module engine ts only one example where:
• The opportunities Io¢higher operational efficlencies were more fully
explored
• The measurable gains In operational efficiency were identified
• Other propulsion concepts exls! for which the possibilities of
greater operational efflcienctes have not been fully explored
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